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Abstract: We propose an empirical trade model to test for structural change and dynamic effects 
induced by free trade agreements for the Canadian and US economies. We estimated a translog 
Gross National Product (GNP) function along with output and factor shares and tested for 
structural change (abrupt or gradual) which is endogenously determined by the data. After this, 
we estimated Stolper-Samuelson (SS) and Rybcynski (R) elasticities, and assessed the stability of 
their sign and magnitude link to the structural change. The null hypothesis of no structural 
change is soundly rejected for both countries. For Canada, we found gradual structural change 
that started prior to the implementation of CUSTA and lasted for several years. In the US case, we 
found evidence of an abrupt structural change occurring in 1995, a year after NAFTA came into 
force. More interestingly, several SS and R elasticities experienced sign reversals and a 
magnification effect over the different sub-periods, implying that the categorization of goods in 
terms of friends or enemies of labour and capital changed during the transition.  
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1. Introduction 
The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA) took effect on January 1 of 1989.  The two 
economies were each other’s most important trading partners before the creation of the 
free trade zone and were already highly integrated.  Tariffs on goods produced within the 
free trade zone were rapidly eliminated and in some cases, the pace of liberalization 
was even accelerated over the 10-year phase-out as initially planned.  Plans to enlarge 
the free trade zone to include Mexico were agreed upon in December of 1992, but the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect in January of 1994.  Since 
this period, Canada and the United States of America (USA henceforth) have been active 
in seeking other regional agreements and are strongly involved in pursuit of bilateral 
trade agreements mirroring the actions of the international community.  The number of 
regional trade agreements (RTAs) notified by the WTO in December of 2008 was 421. 
However, according to the political and social context in the 1980’s, for Canada, 1989 
clearly marked the beginning of a new era in terms of trade policy. In addition, recently 
the debate about NAFTA and its benefits was revived in Canada and in the USA during 
the 2008 US democratic presidential campaign when candidates Hillary Clinton and 
Barack Obama said they wanted to renegotiate the agreement particularly in the field of 
labour standards and the environment. 
It has been known for a long time that RTAs have ambiguous aggregate welfare 
effects (e.g., Lipsey, 1957) and that there will generally be losers even when long run 
aggregate welfare changes are positive.3  This is why regional trade agreements are so 
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  Krishna and Panagariya (2002) have demonstrated that it is possible to implement lump sum transfers keeping 
prices and purchases from the rest of the world unchanged within each country belonging to a free trade area that 
make no individual worse off and the government’s budget in each member country non-negative. Clearly a free 
trade area can be welfare-enhancing for its members, but in practice free trade areas usually involve some trade 
diversion that violates the condition that trade with outside countries remain unchanged. Baldwin and Venables 
(1995, p.1601) propose a decomposition of welfare effects arising from regional trade agreements.  The “trade 
volume” effect pertains to the creation of trade following the reduction of tariffs between member countries.  
The “trade costs” effect weighs lost revenues from tariffs against reductions in policy rents captured by foreign 
interests and the “terms of trade” effect measures the gain from being able to purchase a cheaper import bundle.   
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controversial.4  Back in the mid-1980s, the economic debate in Canada around the 
potential gains from CUSTA revolved around the exploitation of economies of scale and 
pro-competitive effects.  In essence, it was argued that smaller Canadian plants could 
exploit economies of scale through improved access to the US market and that 
integration would make Canadian markets more competitive. Under this premise, 
computable general equilibrium models predicted large gains for Canada (Harris, 1984; 
Cox and Harris, 1985).  Head and Ries (1999) investigated the effect of CUSTA on plant 
scale and found small net effects arising from the offsetting effects of US and Canadian 
tariff reductions. Trefler (2004) relied on disaggregated data to show that pre-CUSTA 
tariffs were higher than commonly believed and that the tariff cuts were large enough to 
“matter”.5  In fact, he found that CUSTA had strong negative effects on employment in 
the most impacted import-competing industries and strong positive effects on labour 
productivity in the most impacted export-oriented industries.  Interestingly, he also found 
substantial increases in labour productivity in industries that were duty-free prior to 
CUSTA. CUSTA encouraged entry and exit of firms (in industries with low sunk costs) and 
allowed some plants in export-oriented industries to expand and reach the so-called 
minimum efficient scale6. Trade reforms are also known to encourage firms to become 
more technically efficient (Tybout et al., 1991).   Efficiency within firms is also likely to 
rise when competition stiffens.  The empirical evidence about the so-called X-efficiency 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4
  Regional trade agreements can be politically divisive, to the point of being the single most important issue in 
an election.  Before his election as Prime Minister of Canada in 1993, then opposition leader Jean Chrétien 
promised to renegotiate NAFTA to garner the support of labour unions. In the United States, Ross Perot and 
more recently Barack Obama made similar threats.  Whatever apprehension Prime Minister Chrétien might have 
held toward regional initiatives must have subsided because NAFTA was enforced as planned and numerous 
initiatives were negotiated during his three terms in office.   
   
5
 At the 4-digit level of product aggregation, tariffs in excess of 10 percent sheltered one in four Canadian 
industries in 1988, but almost no industries had tariffs in excess of 10 percent when industries are defined by 3-
digit level data (Trefler, 2004 p.872).    
 
6
 This result and other details are well documented in Gu et al (2003). 
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gains7 suggests that trade liberalization causes various firm-level and industry-level 
effects (Tybout, 2003).  Clearly, the impacts of regional trade agreements have been 
extensively studied, but little is known about the induced structural change for the 
economy and their impact on Stolper-Samuelson and Rybcynski elasticities.   
Stolper-Samuelson studies have been useful in shedding light on the causes 
behind the widening gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers in 
industrialized countries (e.g., Leamer, 2001), but they have also been useful in 
identifying supporters and opponents of regional trade agreements.  From survey data 
about the 1988 Canadian election, Beaulieu (2002) found that respondents’views about 
CUSTA could be explained by factors of production consideration such as labour skills8.  
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) found a similar result for the USA.  A related question is 
whether CUSTA produced the anticipated Stolper-Samuelson rewards and punishments 
or whether structural change caused by CUSTA changed winners into losers and vice 
versa.        
In this paper, we posit that firm-level, industry and macro impacts induced by 
CUSTA and NAFTA have had a significant effect on the technological characterization of 
the Canadian and USA economies9, thus changing the way factor prices and outputs 
adjust to changes in terms of trade and in factor endowments.  Accordingly, we test for 
structural change in Canada’s and USA’s GNP function and associated Stolper-
Samuelson, Rybczynski, output and factor demand elasticities.  The GNP function 
                                                 
7
 Corden (1974) provides an intuitive discussion while Sjostrom and Weitzman (1996) and Campbell and 
Vousden (2000) provide formal analyses.  
  
8
 In a linked work, Beaulieu and Magee (2004) use data from Political Action Committee (PAC) divided in labor 
and capital groups with deference in the industries represented by each group to examine trade policy preference. 
They ﬁnd that the factor that a group represents are more inﬂuential on trade views than the industry 
characteristics. 
 
9
 We do not analyze the Mexican case because, despite the difficulties we had to collect comparable data to those 
of the USA or Canada; it was very difficult to isolate the effects of various economic shocks experienced by the 
countries to the impact of trade agreement. Indeed, the country has not only started a major move to reduce their 
tariffs in the early 1980s, but they also had a significant political instabilities in the early of 1990s and has faced 
major monetary problems that led the peso crisis between 1994 and 1995. 
 5 
approach has been extensively applied to different countries to analyze a wide variety of 
issues.10  Because CUSTA and NAFTA were not implemented along with other major 
economic reforms in response to significant macro disturbances, as it is often the case 
with trade liberalization analyses involving less developed countries, an analysis of 
CUSTA/NAFTA constitutes as “natural” an experiment as it can be hoped (Tybout, 2003). 
This suggests that structural change might have been abrupt.  However, investments in 
new production capacity and factor movements do not have instantaneous effects on 
production.  Also, because the negotiations take place over extended periods, but have 
a high probability of success, as indicated by the proliferation of regional trade 
agreements, adjustments might have begun before the implementation phase. As 
developed and explained by Freund and McLaren (1999), when a country joins a free 
trade agreement, there is a dynamic adjustment in their trade volume and this is 
essentially related to movements in cost levels and capital investments of firms involved 
in trade with other countries member. They talked about “preaccessing adjustments, 
accelerating and then decelerating adjustment, and a jump in the accession year” (p.16) 
for the member of the agreement11. As such, there could be a continuum of states 
between the two extreme regimes and economic agents do not act promptly and 
uniformly at the same moment, especially because they need time for learning and 
there are some delays before their reactions after some changes in the economic 
environment. In such cases, gradual switching or smooth transition regression models 
are most suitable to characterize the dynamics of adjustment by letting the data 
                                                 
10
 Kolhi(1978) and Lawrence (1989) focused on the Canadian economy and Kolhi’s (1990,1994) analyses 
pertained to the USA.  Kolhi (1982) fitted a GDP function for Switzerland and Kohli and Werner (1998) fitted 
one for South Korea. Harrigan (1997) studied a group of ten OCDE countries. Kee et al (2008) derive import 
demand elasticities to analyze trade distortion in 88 countries. As for the choice of a flexible form, the most 
popular is by far the translog form used by Kohli (1978, 1990, 1983, 1994, 2003) and Sharma (2002).  The 
symmetric normalized quadratic has also been used, notably by Kohli (1993). 
 
11
 This paper of Freund and McLaren is also interesting in the way that, it provides some theoretical and 
anecdotal arguments to convince on how some anticipatory investment induced by the adoption of trade policy 
such as adoption of trade agreement has impact at aggregate level on open economies. 
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determine the beginning and length of the transition period. Otherwise, tests looking for 
one or more abrupt changes at endogenously-determined dates would be warranted. 
One way or the other, it is most pertinent to assess whether SS and R elasticities 
experienced sign reversals, implying that the categorization of goods in terms of friends 
or enemies12 of factors changed and to compare the magnitude of the elasticities before 
and after structural changes.  
There are very few empirical papers analyzing the dynamic aspects of the impact 
of free trade agreements on the economy of the countries involved in the agreement. 
Among these we can cite those of Carrère (2006) and Freund and McLaren (1999) 
which analyze the impact of FTAs on trade for countries mainly involved in the four 
biggest trade blocs (NAFTA, European Union (EU), Common Market of the South 
(MERCOSUR) and European Free Trade agreement (EFTA)). They use a dynamic linear 
equation based on the trade share and trade intensity index of each country. Konno and 
Fukushige (2002) used the gradual switching approach to analyze the impact of CUSTA 
on U.S. and Canadian bilateral import functions. Magee (2008) also showed that the 
effects of regional agreements on bilateral trade flows are gradual, but relied on lagged 
variables to model trade flow dynamics.  Even though empirical GNP functions have 
been featured in many studies, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to 
thoroughly consider structural change in a context of vector smooth transition 
regression13. However, structural change has been considered in the estimation of 
Stolper-Samuelson effects in Leamer (2001), the classic paper which compares the 
evolution of U.S. wages for skilled and unskilled labour for three different decades. In 
contrast to Leamer, we postulate that change occurred gradually and started and ended 
                                                 
12
 These concepts are adapted from Jones and Schienkman (1977). A good is a friend to a factor if an increase in 
its price (in the factor’s endowment) causes an increase in the factor's price (in output of the good). If the effect 
is reversed, then the good is an enemy of the factor.     
 
13
 The are many studies about the effects of trade agreements on the welfare and volume of trade of member and 
non-member countries.  Most rely on the gravity model (e.g, Romalis (2007) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007)). 
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at dates to be determined by the data. We postulate that, in our specification, the 
structural change is implicit but the date is endogenous. Thus, we specify a Smooth 
Multivariate Transition system GNP function model to test for gradual change. We rely 
on the flexible translog functional form to approximate the Canadian (US) GNP function 
and use aggregated data covering the period 1970-2005 (1970-2007). The alternative 
approach proposed by Qu and Perron (2007) posits that structural change is abrupt and 
can occur more than once at unspecified dates.  
The main result of our paper is that, as suggested by Magee (2008), Carrère 
(2006) or Freund and Mclaren (1999), the effect of free trade agreements are not 
necessary punctual but also dynamic, and they can be anticipated or persistent after the 
date of the adoption of the agreement. This finding is illustrated with the case of USA 
and Canada economies in the context of the adoption of CUSTA and NAFTA. For Canada, 
we found gradual structural change that started prior to the implementation of CUSTA 
and lasted for several years. In the US case, we found evidence of an abrupt structural 
change occurring in 1995, a year after NAFTA came into force. The empirical analysis 
also shows that several SS and R elasticities experienced sign reversals and a 
magnification effect over the different sub-periods. 
 Our paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the GNP function, 
its theoretical properties and the empirical specification adopted for estimation 
purposes. The third section focuses on the data, the econometric estimation and our 
structural change test.  The implications of structural change for Stolper-Samuelson, 
Rybcynski, output and factor demand elasticities are analyzed in section four.  The last 
section summarizes our results and their policy implications.    
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2. The Gross National Product Function: Theory and Empirics 
The GNP function of an economy  ,G P V  is conditioned by I output prices and J factor 
endowments.  It is defined as the maximum that can be produced by an economy 
through optimal resource allocation given its technology, factor 
endowment  1,..., JV V V , and output prices  1,..., IP P P :   
   
0
1 1
, max . .
i
I I
i i i i
v
i i
G P V P f v s t v V

 
    ; Where  1,...,i i iJv v v  (1) 
The GNP function results from equilibrium conditions pertaining to the full 
employment of factors of production, perfect competition or unit cost pricing and from 
the technological assumption that production functions  i i iY f v  be positive, 
increasing, concave and homogenous of degree one (Feenstra, 2004 p.65).  Thus, 
changes in output prices induce changes in input allocation that maintain production on 
the production possibility frontier.  The GNP function is increasing and homogenous of 
degree one in prices, increasing and homogenous of degree one in endowments, twice 
differentiable and convex in prices and twice differentiable and concave in endowments 
(Wong, 1995).  By the envelope theorem, equilibrium output levels can be obtained by 
the following first derivatives: 
 / , 1,...,i i i iG P f v Y i I           (2) 
By Young’s theorem, 2 2/ / / /i j i j j i j iY P G P P G P P Y P             . The convexity 
(in prices) property insures that the matrix of second derivatives is positive semi-definite 
which implies that diagonal elements are non-negative: / 0i iY P   .  Under the 
aforementioned assumptions, GNP can be expressed in terms of the value of 
endowments or of outputs since 
1 1
J I
j j i i
j i
w V PY
 
  ( jw is the price of factor j). From the 
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envelope theorem, the relationship between factor prices and factor endowments can 
be obtained from a simple derivative:    
/ / 1,..., ; 1,...,j i i ij jG V P f v w i I j J          (3) 
The so-called reciprocity relations can be obtained by appealing to Young’s 
theorem: 
2 2/ / / /j i j i i j i jw P G V P G P V Y V                (4) 
The first derivative is the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) relation and it is identical to the 
Rybczinsky (R) relation.  The signs of SS effects identify the “friends” and “enemies” of 
each factor as an increase in the price of a given output generally hurts some factors 
and helps others.  The magnitude of the SS effects is of great interest because the gains 
and losses of factors can be assessed by looking at how much their prices decrease or 
increase.  The fact that they are reported as elasticities makes for easy comparisons 
across factors.  The R effects tell us about how an increase in the endowment of a factor 
changes the level of output of a product under the assumption that output prices and 
others factors are constant.    
The most common functional form for the GNP function, and the one used in our 
study, is the Translog function.  It is typically estimated with product and input shares as 
a system of equations:  
0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
ln ln ln ln ln
2
1
ln ln ln ln
2
I J I I
i i j j ik i k
i j i k
J J I J
jh j h ij i j
j h i j
G P V P P
V V P V
   
 
   
   
   
 
  
 
 (5) 
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where, 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1, 0, ,
I J I I J J
i j ik ij ij jk ik ki jh hj
i j i i j j
         
     
              are restrictions 
related to adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry properties. These parametric 
restrictions greatly reduce the number of parameters to be estimated.14   
 Differentiation of GNP function (5) with respect to ln iP  yields to the share of 
output i: 
1 1
ln / ln ln ln
I J
i i i ij j ij j
j j
s G P P V  
 
           (6) 
 Differentiation of GDP function (5) with respect to ln jV  yields the share of input j: 
1 1
ln / ln ln ln
J J
j j j jh h ji i
h i
s G V V P  
 
           (7) 
From the estimated coefficients and product and input shares, several elasticities 
can be computed. More specifically, since k kk
w V
s
G
 , ln ln ln lnk k kw s G V   , and 
i i
i
PY
s
G
 , ln ln ln lni i iY s G P   , SS and R elasticities are computed as:  
ln / ln kik i i
k
w P s
s

    ;      (8) 
ln / ln iki k k
i
Y V s
s

    ;       (9) 
while factor price flexibilities and output elasticities are computed as:  
1,if
ln / ln
,if
jj
j
j
j h
jh
h
j
s j h
s
w V
s j h
s



  

   
  


    (10) 
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 The convexity in prices and concavity in endowments properties cannot be imposed through simple parametric 
restrictions.  If the properties do not hold at points of interest (i.e., at the mean or for a particular year), then it is 
possible to impose the properties locally as shown in Diewert and Wales (1997) and Ryan and Wales (1998).   
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1,if
ln / ln
,if
ii
i
i
i k
ik
k
i
s k i
s
Y P
s k i
s



  

   
  

     (11) 
For practical consideration, each equation in (6) and (7) can be written more 
compactly as:    t t ty X e     (12) 
where 
ty  is a vector of dependent variables,   a vector of parameters, tX  a vector of 
independent variables and te  a vector of error terms.   
The introduction of gradual structural change is implemented by a multivariate 
smooth transition regression model developed by Bacon and Watts (1971), Tsurumi 
(1980), Ohtani and Takayama (1985) and Tsurumi et al (1986).15 The challenge is to 
correctly identify the beginning of the transition and its speed. With a gradual structural 
change, equation (12) can be rewritten as follows: 
    1, 2, , ,ht h ht h ht t hty X X F TV        16    (13) 
where tTV  the transition variable, htX  is a vector of exogenous variables, 1,h  and 2,h  are 
( 1hp  ) vectors of parameters, and h denotes a sequence of independent identically 
distributed errors, the subscript h denotes a particular equation in the system.  
( , , )tF TV    is the transition function.  It is continuous, bounded between 0 and 1 and it 
varies with the transition variable ts  according to the estimated parameters    and  .17   
In most applications, ( , , )tF TV    is approximated by the logistic function or the 
exponential function.  As noted by Van Dijk et al. (2002), the choice between these two 
                                                 
15
 Camacho (2004) provides an excellent review of multivariate or vector smooth transition regressions. Smooth 
transition regressions have been also used in system of demand estimation among other by Moschini and Meilke 
(1989), Goodwin (1992), Holt and Balagtas (2009)  and Goodwin et al. (2003).  
 
16
 An alternative representation is     1, 2,1 , , , ,ht h ht t h ht t hty X F TV X F TV           . 
 
17
 Here we suppose that the transition function is the same in all equations because we impose a common regime 
switching for all equations.  
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functions generally depends on the nature of the dynamics to be investigated. For 
example, the logistic function is more appropriate to study business cycles, but the 
exponential function is more appropriate for regime switching between two different and 
distinct regimes. Accordingly, we chose the exponential function which is defined as: 
  2( , , ) 1 expt tF TV TV       , 0.   
This function is non-monotonic and symmetric around  .  The parameter  is the 
threshold representing the date at which the transition begins (i.e.,  , , 0F     ) and   
is the speed of adjustment between the two regimes. The transition variable chosen is 
the linear trend of the model ( tTV t ).  As a result, our model can be construed as a 
time-varying multivariate smooth transition model.   
The abrupt structural change model is that developed by Qu and Perron (2007).  In 
essence, the case with coefficients taking one set of values throughout the period 
covered by the sample is pitted against models with coefficients taking two or more 
values over the sample18.  The main advantage of the procedure is that the number of 
structural breaks and the dates at which they occur are endogenously determined.  
Furthermore, it is possible to compute confidence intervals around the dates of the 
breaks to see whether they encompass known events.   
 
3. Data and econometric estimation 
                                                 
18
 This procedure posits that structural change in a system of equations, occurring at unknown date can affect the 
regression coefficients, the covariance matrix of the errors, or both.  The estimation method is quasi-maximum 
likelihood based on normal errors, and both conditional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are allowed. For 
more details about the model and the different specifications, reader can look directly the paper. 
 
 13 
The Canadian time series used in our analysis come from Statistics Canada and the 
International Monetary Fund and cover the period 1970-2005.19  The data for USA are 
obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and cover the period 1970-2007. 
While the translog functional form offers the advantage of being flexible enough to 
provide a second degree approximation of any technology, this advantage comes at a 
cost because the number of parameters to be estimated increases rapidly with the 
numbers of products (I) and factors (J). This is why most studies about the GNP function 
have relied on a few broadly-defined products and factors. Following Kohli and Werner 
(1998) and Kohli (2004), we rely on two factors of production, capital (K) and labour (L), 
and three outputs, exports (X), domestic sales (D) and imports (M).   Imports are 
considered as intermediate products, requiring various domestic services such as 
unloading, transportation, storage, repackaging, marketing and retailing, before being 
consumed. Because exports must be tailored to suit the specificities of importing 
countries, they are differentiated from domestic goods. More details about the data are 
presented in appendix 1, and descriptive statistics are reported in tables 1 and 2.  
Figures 1 and 3 illustrate trends in the relative price of imports and exports using 
the price of domestic goods as the numeraire for Canada and USA. Figure 1 shows some 
sort of cyclical movement, after an ascending trend during the 1970s, the relative prices 
of imports and exports followed a downward trend over 10 years before embarking on 
an another upward trend. In contrast, Figure 2 shows that the relative price of imports 
and exports was increasing before 1970 and then started a declining trend which could 
be a consequence of trade liberalization and the tariff cuts.  
                                                 
19
 It was impossible for us to have data staring before 1970 because since 1997, Statistics Canada introduced a 
big change in the methodology of producing aggregate data for the economy and many series available ended in 
1997. 
 14 
Figures 2 and 4 illustrate trends in capital intensity20 for Canada and the USA over 
the sample period. Globally, the two graphs show an upward trend with faster growth for 
Canada after 1989,  when CUSTA came into force, and after 1994, when NAFTA came 
into force, for the USA. 
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics about key variables. The negative 
sign associated with the import share is explained by the treatment of imports as inputs 
requiring at least some transformation before being marketed to consumers (Kohli, 
1991, p.62)21. According to Table 1, it can be seen that the Canadian economy 
experienced a notable change in technology particularly in the use of labour and capital. 
The share of capital increases significantly prior to the period before and after the 
adoption of the two trade agreements. For the US economy, the share does not 
significantly change over the different periods. Then, as we can anticipate for a small 
economy like the Canadian economy, in general, structural change occurred more 
quickly and deeper than a big economy like the US economy. 
We estimated a three-equation system including the I-1 product shares and J-1 
factor shares. We relied on the iterative seemingly-unrelated estimator to account for 
contemporaneous correlation between the residuals of the three equations.  Our main 
hypothesis is that CUSTA brought about a major structural change that impacted the 
parameters of Canada’s GNP function.  This could have occurred through a gradual 
process whose beginning anticipated CUSTA and lasted several years due to various 
short run constraints.  Preliminary estimations revealed autocorrelation problems that 
led us to estimate the system of share equations in first differences:  
1 1
ln ln
I J
i ij j ij j
j j
s P V 
 
        , ,i M X D    (14) 
                                                 
20
For the specify economy, it is the ratio between the stock of capital and the volume of labour evaluate in terms 
of total of worked hours. 
 
21
 This hypothesis is more explained and used in recent paper of Kee et al (2008). 
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1 1
ln ln
J I
j jh h ji i
h i
s V P 
 
        ,j L K     (15) 
Keeping in mind that    , , ,h i j i jy s s X P V  , equation (13) becomes:  
 1, 2, , ,ht h h ht hty X X F t              (16) 
We can test for a linear specification against the smooth transition regression in 
two ways. We can test the null hypothesis of linearity by restricting the parameters in 2,h  
to equal zero or alternatively we can restrict the coefficients in such a way as to set F to 
zero ( 0  ).   
Then, the null hypothesis of linearity for equation (16) can be expressed as : 
0 : 0H   against 0 : 0H    
Or as 0 2: 0hH   against 0 2: 0hH    
According to this, we noted that some parameters are not identified under the null 
hypothesis. For example in the first test, the parameters 2h  and µ are not identified and 
for the second,   and µ are not identified either. 
Consequently, standard tests like the likelihood ratio test, the Lagrange multiplier 
test or the Wald test do not follow their standard distribution. To overcome this problem, 
Luukkonen et al. (1988) proposed a solution which consists of replacing the transition 
function by a Taylor approximation of an appropriate order. Alternative appeals is a test 
proposed by Hansen (1996) which consists of approximating the limit distribution by 
generating p-values through simulation methods.  We use a first degree Taylor 
approximation around 0  and then replace  , ,F t    by: 
 
 
 1 1
0
, ,
, , , ,
F t
T t R t

 
    



 

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where  1 , ,R t    is the remainder term.22  Substituting  1 , ,T t   for  , ,F t   in (16) and 
rearranging terms yields the auxiliary model:  
2
0, 1, 2,h h h h hy X Xt Xt           (17) 
with  2, 1 , ,h h hX R t       , 
2
0, 1, 2,h h h     , 1, 2,2h h   and 2, 2, 2,h i h   . 
The null hypothesis of linearity can be summarized as 0 ,: 0; 1,2; ,l hH l h i j     
and it is equivalent to 0 2,: 0hH   or 0 : 0H   . We notice that h h   under the null 
hypothesis.  A Lagrange multiplier test distributed with 6 2 12p    degrees of freedom 
can then be computed to ascertain the reasonableness of the restrictions under the null 
hypothesis. To avoid the problem of spurious rejection of linearity due to 
heteroskedasticity of an unknown form, we use heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors.  
For Canada, the LM statistic for the nonlinearity test is 26.25 and it exceeds the 
corresponding 5% (or 10%) critical value of 21.03(18.55). As a result, we reject the null 
hypothesis of linearity and consider from this point on that Canada’s GNP function has 
undergone a process of gradual structural change. Table 2 reports the estimated 
parameters and the fit of the model. The coefficient of determination for the model is 
high (R2 = 0.78)23 and many parameters are significant. The two parameters linked to the 
transition function are significant and we have 3.52  for the speed of adjustment 
and 0.07  for the threshold, corresponding to the year 199724. As illustrated by the 
graph of the transition function in Figure 3, the structural break started around the year 
                                                 
22
 Refering to Escribano and Jorda (1999), a second order approximation should be more accurate, but as noticed 
by Van Dijk et al. (2002), there is a trade-off because the extra variables in the auxiliary regression mean more 
parameters to estimate.  Furthermore, tests based on first order approximations have as much power as tests 
based on second order approximations. 
23
 The system R
2
 is computed by the method proposed by McElroy (1977) for the SURE model. 
 
24
 We have to mention that to overcome some difficulties at the estimation stage, we normalized the time trend 
and price variables to their 1997 value. 
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1984 and continued until 2005.  The estimated changes occur symmetrically in around 
1997.  In other words, the structural change takes place gradually from the first regime to 
the second regime in 1997, and then switched progressively back to the first regime. This 
result is reminiscent of the results reported in Magee (2008) and Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) who found that bilateral trade flows had begun adjusting prior to the 
implementation of CUSTA and kept on adjusting for years afterward.   
We can divide our sample to focus on the regimes prior to and after the transition 
period. We can now go back to Table 1 to compare the average over regime I and regime 
II. The reduction of labour’s share in the economy from the first to the second regime is 
most visible and so is the increasing share of capital. 
For the USA, the LM statistic for the nonlinearity test is 8.17 and it does not 
exceed the corresponding 10% critical value of 18.55. As a result, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of linearity and gradual structural change cannot be considered in this 
case. Then, an alternative is to consider one or more abrupt changes . As mentioned 
before, we can implement the procedure proposed by Qu and Perron (2007)25 to obtain 
the date(s) of structural change(s). We can then conduct Chow tests around the structural 
change date(s) suggested by the Qu and Perron (2007) procedure. Before presenting 
these results, it is insightful to glance at the results obtained with the gradual switching 
regression and see how they relate to the results under the abrupt change assumption. 
Table 4 reports the parameters estimates and the fit of the model. The coefficient of 
determination for the model is high (R2 = 0.80) and many parameters are significant. The 
two parameters linked to the transition function are significant and we have 0.082  for 
the speed of adjustment and 1.091  for the threshold.. Not surprisingly, the value of the 
speed of adjustment gamma is superior to the estimated speed for Canada. We can see 
                                                 
25
 Qu and Perron (2007) propose a procedure of studying (estimation, inference and computation) of multiple 
structural change occurring at unknown dates in a linear multivariate regression models estimated with a quasi 
maximum likelihood based on normal errors. 
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then in the graph of transition function (Figure 6) that the structural break might have 
started in 1995 and did not last long.  This suggests that structural change might be 
easier to identify with a procedure that search for abrupt changes, like the method of Qu 
and Perron (2007) combined to a classical Chow test. The estimated date of break is the 
year 1995 and the 90% confidence interval for the break date is 1991 and 1999 (i.e, ± 4 
years), which includes the date at which NAFTA came into force. We divided our sample 
into two sub periods around 1995. The estimation results conducted over these two 
subsamples and the full sample are presented in Table 5. Most of the parameters are 
statistically significant and quite different across samples.  The fit measured by the 
system’s R² is quite good. To implement the Chow test, we use the likelihood ratio test 
  22 u c kLR LLF LLF   , where uLLF  and cLLF  are the log likelihood functions for the 
unconstrained and constrained models and k = 6 is the number of parameters to be 
estimated in the constrained model. We obtained a LR statistic of 11.13 that exceeds the 
corresponding 10% critical value of 10.64. As a result, we must reject the null   
hypothesis that the parameters before 1995 and the parameters after 1995 periods are 
the same.  We are confident that NAFTA, not CUSTA, had a significant impact on the USA.  
Canada and the USA have responded differently to regional integration initiatives.  
Canada’s structural change occurred around the adoption of CUSTA and lasted several 
years whereas the USA experienced an abrupt structural change only after NAFTA came 
into force.  This suggests that the US economy is more flexible than the Canadian 
economy and/or that a small economy must undergo more drastic changes that take 
longer to put in place.  This is not surprising because terms of trade changes induced by 
trade liberalization should have a relatively larger impact on the smaller country.26   
                                                 
26
 Country size matters as argued by Syropoulos (2002). Starting from a Nash tariff equilibrium, moving to free 
trade makes the small (large) country better (worse) off.  In a simple Ricardian setting, the large country remains 
incompletely specialized while the small country becomes completely specialized when moving from autarky to 
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4. Goods and Factors Linkages: When Friends become Enemies and Enemies become 
Friends 
The Stolper-Samuelson, Rybczynski, output and factor demand elasticities presented in 
Tables 6 and 7 are estimated at the mean of each subsample (for one regime or for one 
period).  Confidence intervals computed using the method proposed by Krinski and Robb 
(1986)27 are also reported. The simulated empirical distributions of the elasticities are 
based on 1000 draws.  
Before going more profoundly into the analysis of those results, we will make some 
comments about the context of our paper. The point is that, we are not in the classic two 
countries, two goods and two factors HOS classical models and then, the four main 
theorems do not necessary hold, particularly the R and SS ones. Therefore, some of our R 
and SS elasticities that may be seen sometimes puzzling are not. The justification of 
those results is the departure from the classical assumptions; in our model, we have 
three goods and two factors. The theoretical analysis of this type of model is not the 
scope of our paper particularly because the discussion, concerning the higher 
dimensional issues in the HOS model, is extensively documented in the literature. For 
example, we can refere to the first three chapters of the handbook of international trade 
(volume 1), by Choi and Harrigan (2003), from where we borrowed this meaningful 
citation: 
                                                                                                                                                        
free trade.  As a result, all of the trade gains accrue to the small country.  Feenstra (2004, p.151) also relates the 
magnitude of border effects to the size of countries.     
 
27 
A simulation method is implemented to derive the empirical distributions of the elasticities. Denoting a vector 
of parameter estimates by M and the corresponding variance-covariance matrix by V, we take random drawings 
for vector of parameters from a multivariate normal distribution defined by M and V. For each draw, we 
compute the elasticities and from a large enough number of draws we can generate an empirical distribution for 
each elasticity. 
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"There is not much virtue in simplicity if a result that holds in a model of two countries, two 
commodities, and two factors does not generalize in any meaningful way to higher dimensions." John 
Chipman (1987, p. 922)28. 
Finally, as indicated by Feenstra (2004, p.71), the Rybcynski theorem does not 
hold when there are more factors than goods while a generalized version of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem continues to hold. 
The point estimates for elasticities in the two regimes for Canada or the two 
periods for the USA are generally consistent with those reported in the literature and 
most of them are significantly different from zero. We can notice in comparing results 
across regimes that there are two main effects that emerge in the description of the 
evolution of the elasticities. Firstly, there is a sign reversal effect which implies that 
goods that were friends to a particular factor have become enemies of that factor and, 
conversely, that enemies have become friends. Secondly, there is a scale effect that 
inflates the absolute value of import demand, export supply and inverse factor demand 
elasticities. According to the objective of the paper, SS and R elasticities are the focus of 
this analysis, and our comment of the other elasticities are very brief. 
Let us start with the results concerning the Canadian economy, which are 
reported in Table 6. The Stolper-Samuelson elasticities reported for the first regime 
indicate that an increase in the price of exports had a negative effect on the price of 
labour, and that an increase in the price of imports decreased the price of capital. In 
contrast, wages tend to rise in response to raises in the price of imports and in the price 
of domestic goods.  The price of capital increased following increases in the prices of 
exports and domestic goods. Given that trade liberalization typically induces higher 
export prices and lower import prices that combine to create improvements in the terms 
of trade, labour unions had reasons to be sceptical about the alleged benefits of CUSTA 
                                                 
28
 Choi, E. Kwan, “Implications of many commodities in the Heckscher-Ohlin model,” Choi and Harrigan (eds.), 
Handbook of International Trade, Volume 1. Blackwell Publishing (2003). 
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for their members as opposed to owners of capital who were generally pro-CUSTA. These 
results are consistent with Beaulieu’s (2002) analysis of survey data in the year 
preceding the implementation of CUSTA.  The elasticities for the period following the 
transition are quite different.  In the second regime, the price of labour reacted 
negatively (positively) to increases in the price of imports (exports) while the opposite 
can be said about the price of capital.  However, insofar as imports and exports prices 
have declined following the implementation of CUSTA, the net combined effect on the 
price of labour is positive, confirming the results of Trefler (2004). Because the price of 
capital has increased in the post-transition period, we can infer from the simultaneous 
reductions in imports and exports prices that export price reductions ended up having a 
stronger positive effect on the price of capital. Finally, over the two regimes, our 
estimates show that increases in the price of domestic goods tended to boost prices of 
labour and capital. This result is consistent with those of the literature, especially Kohli 
and Werner (1998). 
Turning our attention to the US Stolper-Samuelson elasticities, which are 
reported in first part of Table 7. We can see that during the first period an increase in 
the price of imports had a negative effect on the prices of labour and capital. This 
means that imports were enemies of labour and capital. If we consider imports as 
intermediate inputs, we can say that they were substitutes for labour and capital in the 
USA before 1995. In contrast, exports and domestic goods are friends of the two inputs. 
The elasticities pertaining to the inverse factor demand of labour vary substantially 
across regimes. We can observe sign reversals as imports became a friend of labour 
and exports became an enemy.  In contrast, the inverse labour demand for domestic 
goods did not change. As for the SS effects on the price of capital, the signs remain the 
same across regime, but the elasticities have increased in the second period for the 
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three goods.  Following the terminology of Jones and Scheinkman (1977), domestic and 
export goods are friends of capital. 
In the case of Canada, for the period preceding the CUSTA transition, Rybcynski 
elasticities indicate that an increase in labour endowment had a significant positive 
effect on domestic sales, but a negative effect on imports and exports.  An increase in 
capital endowment had a significant positive effect on imports, exports and domestic 
sales. As illustrated in figure 2, the Canadian economy experienced large increases in its 
capital-labour ratio during the transition years, which increased the production capacity 
of the Canadian economy.  Comparing the “before” and “after” regimes, we observe a 
sign reversal in the R elasticities for imports and exports. In regime II, labour favours all 
three GNP components, but capital hurts imports and exports. Knowing that the amount 
of capital has increased significantly during the transition period, we can conclude that 
observed endowment changes supported consumption of domestic products at the 
expense of imports and exports as in Kohli and Werner’s (1998) study about South 
Korea. Still, both South Korea and Canada experienced rapid growth in imports and 
exports.  In the case of Canada, the evolution of import, domestic and export prices 
ended up offsetting the effects of structural change.  
Concerning the Rybczynski elasticities for the USA, the second part of Table 7, 
estimates show that over the two periods changes occurred only for imports and 
exports. There is a sign reversal in the impact of labour endowment on the demand of 
import and the production of exports goods. In the first period, an increase in labour 
endowment induced increases in imports and exports. However, in the second period, 
the result is opposite as the production of traded goods fell in response to increases in 
labour endowment. Comparing, we see that the impact of an increase in the stock of 
capital had a stronger positive effect on the production of traded goods after NAFTA 
came into force.  We find no evidence of change in the quantity elasticities of domestic 
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goods when we compare the two periods. The non-trading sector in the USA is very large 
and this might explain why it was seemingly oblivious to NAFTA.   
Looking at the Canadian import demand and output supply prices elasticities, 
table 6 shows that the export and domestic supplies are inelastic ( 0.72I XX  , 
0.33IDD  ) while the import demand elasticity has the wrong sign, but is not statistically 
different from zero in regime I.  However, the import demand elasticity ( 2.05II MM   ) 
has the right sign and is significantly different from zero in regime II. Prior to the 
transition, the higher price of imports increased exports, thus mimicking the effects of a 
currency devaluation, and decreased domestic production which suggests that the latter 
relies on foreign inputs. In regime II, an increase in export prices triggers increases in 
imports and in domestic production, which suggests that imports are increasingly used 
as inputs in export manufacturing and that exports and domestic goods are 
complements in production. In the case of the USA, import demand and output supplies 
are inelastic. In the first period, the demand for imports is sensitive to the prices of the 
three goods. The supply of export goods is sensitive to changes in the price of imports 
and exports, but the price elasticities for domestic goods are near zero. The demand for 
imports decreases when the price of imports goes up and increases when the price of 
exports goes up. The production of export goods reacts negatively to increases in the 
domestic price and positively with the price of imports and exports. The most notable 
change appears for the cross price elasticities between exports and domestic goods. In 
the first period, this elasticity is near zero and in the second period, it becomes inferior 
to minus one. This means that after 1995, exports and domestic goods became 
complementary goods. 
In terms of Canadian factor demands, the own-price elasticities for labour and 
capital have the expected negative signs before and after the CUSTA transition period. 
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However, we notice sizeable scale effects that render these demands more elastic over 
time ( 0.31, 0.72, 0.22, 0.73I II I IIKK KK LL LL           ). The elasticities for the USA 
have the same signs as the Canadian ones, but their size differ as well as their changes 
across regimes ( 0.57, 0.65, 1.09, 1.04I II I IIKK KK LL LL           ). 
 
5- Conclusion 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue that free trade agreements on average double the 
volume of trade between two members after 10 years.  Using plant-level data, Tybout 
(1991, 2003) and Trefler (2004) among others found that free trade agreements induce 
gains in productivity and technical efficiency at the firm level. These effects are 
universally perceived as positive changes, yet there is much opposition to regional 
initiatives in developed and developing countries alike. Part of the opposition is 
motivated by the expected effects of output price variations on factor prices -the so-
called Stolper-Samuelson (SS) effects. For example, Beaulieu (2002) used survey data 
collected prior to the implementation of the Canada-US Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and 
found that support or opposition to the proposed regional initiative could be explained 
by a large extent by the SS theorem.  SS and Rybczinsky (R) elasticities are a by-product 
of the Gross National Product function, a powerful theoretical concept that has provided 
the foundation for many empirical analyses.  However, we are not aware of any empirical 
study using a Multivariate Smooth Transition Regression framework or the Qu and 
Perron (2007) endogenous structural change approach to analyze the impact on R and 
SS elasticities of regional trade agreements through a GNP function. 
We use a GNP function with endogenous structural change to investigate the 
impact of CUSTA and NAFTA.  We were particularly interested in: 1) finding which of 
CUSTA or NAFTA had the largest impact on Canada and the United States; 2) 
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characterizing the transition phase between regimes; and 3) assessing the nature and 
magnitude of changes in SS and R, and other elasticities of interest for the Canadian 
and US economies. Carrère (2006) and Freund and McLaren (1999) show that there is 
dynamic pattern in the effect of RTA for countries members. Magee’s (2008) results 
show that bilateral trade flows began adjusting to CUSTA prior to CUSTA’s 
implementation.  As in Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Magee also showed that the 
effects of CUSTA were not instantaneous.  Accordingly, we allowed for a smooth 
transition beginning and ending at endogenously determined dates in the estimation of 
our Gross National Production function. The bulk of the changes occurred over the 
1985-1996 period, that is, two years before the implementation of CUSTA and two years 
after NAFTA. Then, our result is consistent with recent papers studying the effects of 
trade agreements which take into account dynamic aspects. 
For the US economy, the test of gradual transition was not conclusive. 
Nevertheless, the procedure of Qu and Perron (2007) revealed that an abrupt structural 
change happened a year after the adoption of NAFTA. The contrasts in the nature and 
timing of the structural changes in the USA and in Canada suggest that the US economy 
is more flexible (particularly its labour market) and that country size matters.  The 
adjustments are relatively more important for smaller countries.  We also found sign 
reversals in SS and R elasticities. Prior to CUSTA, imports were friends of Canadian 
workers while exports were enemies.  Results from survey data in Beaulieu (2002) 
support a similar conclusion and hence justify the opposition of Canadian labour unions 
to CUSTA prior to its implementation.  However, after the 11-year transition period, 
Canadian exports have turned into friends and imports into enemies while the opposite 
holds for the USA.     
Though our paper extends the literature about the effects of a regional trade 
agreement on the economy by testing for structural change and assessing its impact on 
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key economic elasticities, there are some directions in which further research are 
possible. Specially, two extensions are possible by working at a disaggregated level. 
First, it would be interesting to work with more disaggregated variables such as 
investments goods, governments expenditures or consumption goods in place of 
domestic demand, or dividing labour by unskilled and skilled labour, etc. We can also 
think about the estimation of our model with data of firms or plants instead of national 
level; this could offer the possibility of introducing data from Mexico. 
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Appendix: Data construction 
 
The variables were constructed as in most empirical studies using GNP functions and 
following some recommendations from Kohli (1991, chap 8).   
Working at an aggregate level, to evaluate domestic production or GNP, we used 
the income and expenditure approaches. According to the income approach, the gross 
national product is equal to the sum of the value of exports and national expenditures 
minus imports. Imports and exports are evaluated net of foreign transfers. The volumes 
of imports and exports were extracted from StatCan’s CANSIM II database and related 
prices. The volume of national expenditures was extracted from CANSIM II and the 
prices associated with the consumption aggregate are the Canadian national consumer 
price index. 
In the implementation of the second approach, we assume that the gross national 
product can be calculated like the sum of the factors’ remuneration. This relation gives 
us an estimate of the remuneration of capital for the economy. After approximating the 
remuneration of labour by the total of salary paid per year in the economy, we obtain the 
amount of the remuneration of the capital by simple deduction. Then, with the volume 
(or stock) of capital obtained from the StatCan’s database, we can estimate the price of 
capital. The price of labour was computed by dividing the remuneration of labour by the 
volume of work.  The latter is defined as the product of the employment level and the 
hours worked per week.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of output shares and input shares for Canada 
  
Full Sample (1970-2005) Pre-CUSTA (1970-1989) Post-CUSTA (1989-2005) Regime I (1970-1984) Regime II (1985-2005) 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Output shares 
Imports -0.195 0.077 -0.133 0.031 -0.265 0.045 -0.119 0.019 -0.300 0.012 
Exports 0.258 0.081 0.201 0.031 0.324 0.069 0.192 0.028 0.376 0.029 
Consumption 0.936 0.022 0.931 0.014 0.941 0.029 0.928 0.013 0.925 0.024 
Input shares 
Labour 0.545 0.042 0.578 0.026 0.510 0.024 0.587 0.022 0.492 0.010 
Capital 0.454 0.042 0.422 0.026 0.490 0.024 0.413 0.022 0.508 0.010 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of output shares and input shares for USA 
 
 
 
 
  
Full Sample Pre-CUSTA Post-CUSTA Regime I (1970-1995) Regime II (1996-2007) 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Output shares 
Imports -0,123 0,032 -0,099 0,020 -0,148 0,022 -0,106 0,021 -0,160 0,017 
Exports 0,103 0,018 0,088 0,014 0,117 0,008 0,095 0,017 0,119 0,009 
Consumption 1,021 0,020 1,011 0,014 1,031 0,021 1,011 0,012 1,042 0,018 
Input shares 
Capital 0,356 0,032 0,350 0,014 0,362 0,042 0,342 0,019 0,387 0,032 
Labour 0,644 0,032 0,650 0,014 0,638 0,042 0,658 0,019 0,613 0,032 
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Figure 1: Terms of trade from 1970 to 2005 for Canada 
PXR : Relative price of exports; PMR : Relative price of imports. 
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Figure 2: Capital-labour endowment ratio from 1970-to 2005 for Canada 
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Figure 3: Terms of trade from 1970 to 2007 for USA 
PXR : Relative price of exports; PMR : Relative price of imports. 
 
 
Figure 4: Capital intensity from 1970 to 2007 for USA 
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Table 3: Smooth Transition Regression model for Canada 
 
Parameters 
Regime I (1970-1984) Regime II (1985-2005) 
Estimate Standard Errors Estimate Standard Errors 
   MM -0.228*** 0.066 0.218* 0.114 
   MX 0.166** 0.069 -0.212** 0.093 
  δML 0.162*** 0.051 -0.266** 0.123 
   XX 0.277*** 0.095 -0.191* 0.116 
  δXL -0.252*** 0.022 0.333*** 0.082 
  
LL  
0.115 0.087 -0.116 0.161 
Gamma 0,007** 0,003   
Mu 3.517** 1.479   
System Fit : R2  0.777   
Number of observations :  T= 35   
Note: ***, **,* Parameters significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
 
Table 4: Smooth Transition Regression model for USA 
 
Parameters 
Regime I (1970-1995) Regime II (1996-2007) 
Estimate Std Errors Estimate Std Errors 
   MM -0.363*** 0.075 0.265 0.078 
   MX 0.057 0.049 0.011 0.059 
  δML 0.142** 0.062 -0.149 0.070 
   XX 0.508** 0.217 -0.489 0.229 
  δXL -0.100 0.068 0.073 0.074 
  LL  
0.166* 0.091 -0.394 0.140 
Gamma 0.083* 0,031   
Mu 1.091** 0.526   
System Fit : R2  0.800   
Number of observations :  T= 37   
Note: ***,**,* Parameters significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
 
Table 5: Regression model with abrupt structural change 
 
Parameters All sample Period 1 Period 2 
Estimate Std Errors Estimate Std Errors Estimate Std Errors 

MM -0,113*** 0,016 -0,106*** 0,016 -0,271*** 0,037 

MX 0,075*** 0,022 0,068*** 0,024 0,100*** 0,030 
δML 0,000 0,025 -0,008 0,026 0,106*** 0,036 

XX 0,025 0,037 0,025 0,041 0,157 0,121 
δXL -0,011 0,022 -0,016 0,026 -0,053 0,049 
LL  
-0,159** 0,084 -0,150** 0,070 -0,164 0,202 
System Fit : R² 0,670 0,740 0,790 
Log likelihood 394,500 277,950 127,680 
T 38 26 12 
Note: ***, ** Parameters significant at 1%, 5% level, respectively 
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Figure 5: Timing and Speed of the Transition between Regimes for Canada 
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Figure 6: Timing and Speed of the Transition between Regimes for USA 
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Table 6 : Elasticities Before and After the CUSTA Transition (Canada) 
 
  Regime I Regime II 
Estimate 
90% Confidence Interval* 
Estimate 
90% Confidence Interval* 
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound 
i) Price elasticities of inverse factor demands - Stolper-Samuelson elasticities 
LM 0,160 0,014 0,298 -0,827 -1,223 -0,414 
LX -0,250 -0,314 -0,187 1,026 0,753 1,298 
LD 1,089 0,966 1,217 0,801 0,527 1,049 
KM -0,509 -0,706 -0,302 0,235 -0,165 0,617 
KX 0,792 0,702 0,883 -0,307 -0,571 -0,046 
KD 0,717 0,535 0,892 1,071 0,831 1,333 
ii) Quantity elasticities of outputs supplies - Rybczynski elasticities 
ML -0,814 -1,516 -0,076 1,416 0,708 2,089 
MK 1,814 1,071 2,515 -0,416 -1,093 0,291 
XL -0,815 -1,026 -0,611 1,446 1,062 1,830 
XK 1,815 1,611 2,026 -0,446 -0,830 -0,067 
DL 0,684 0,606 0,764 0,420 0,276 0,550 
DK 0,316 0,236 0,394 0,580 0,450 0,722 
iii) Price elasticities of import demand and output supply 
MM 0,852 -0,065 1,816 -2,045 -2,705 -1,416 
MX -1,251 -2,283 -0,244 1,087 0,543 1,631 
MD 0,399 -0,262 1,046 0,958 0,532 1,384 
XM 0,805 0,155 1,466 -0,895 -1,344 -0,450 
XX 0,721 -0,182 1,590 -1,198 -1,760 -0,656 
XD -1,526 -1,867 -1,178 2,094 1,847 2,338 
DM -0,049 -0,130 0,030 -0,294 -0,425 -0,164 
DX -0,293 -0,359 -0,226 0,779 0,687 0,870 
DD 0,343 0,259 0,426 -0,485 -0,582 -0,385 
iv) Quantity elasticities of inverse factor demands 
LL -0,216 -0,449 0,040 -0,743 -1,279 -0,263 
LK 0,216 -0,041 0,446 0,743 0,261 1,279 
KL 0,308 -0,058 0,635 0,720 0,253 1,239 
KK -0,308 -0,638 0,057 -0,720 -1,240 -0,254 
 
Note: *Confidence Intervals are computed using the method proposed by Krinski and Robb (1986); 
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Table 7 : Elasticities at the sample mean according to the abrupt structural change (USA) 
 
 
Regime I Regime II 
Estimate 
90% Confidence Interval* 
Estimate 
90% Confidence Interval* 
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound 
i) Price elasticities of inverse factor demands-Stolper-Samuelson elasticities 
LM -0,131 -0,254 -0,008 0,114 -0,041 0,260 
LX 0,048 -0,077 0,179 -0,018 -0,227 0,189 
LD 1,083 0,946 1,215 0,905 0,705 1,114 
KM -0,094 -0,157 -0,030 -0,333 -0,427 -0,236 
KX 0,120 0,051 0,184 0,205 0,074 0,336 
KD 0,974 0,905 1,045 1,128 0,996 1,254 
 
ii) Quantity elasticities of outputs supplies-Rybczynski elasticities 
ML 0,421 0,026 0,817 -0,274 -0,633 0,097 
MK 0,579 0,183 0,974 1,274 0,901 1,629 
XL 0,171 -0,276 0,642 -0,060 -0,743 0,616 
XK 0,829 0,353 1,275 1,060 0,381 1,740 
DL 0,366 0,320 0,411 0,336 0,262 0,414 
DK 0,634 0,589 0,680 0,664 0,586 0,738 
iii) Price elasticities of import demand and output supply 
MM -0,111 -0,342 0,126 0,528 0,144 0,907 
MX -0,540 -0,878 -0,174 -0,504 -0,818 -0,199 
MD 0,651 0,435 0,852 -0,024 -0,361 0,316 
XM 0,603 0,190 0,981 0,683 0,269 1,105 
XX -0,643 -1,318 0,066 0,443 -1,326 2,169 
XD 0,040 -0,386 0,460 -1,126 -2,547 0,263 
DM -0,068 -0,090 -0,046 0,004 -0,049 0,055 
DX 0,004 -0,036 0,043 -0,128 -0,290 0,030 
DD 0,065 0,023 0,105 0,124 0,005 0,245 
iv) Quantity elasticities of inverse factor demands 
LL -1,097 -1,435 -0,755 -1,038 -1,885 -0,195 
LK 1,097 0,752 1,435 1,038 0,193 1,879 
KL 0,570 0,390 0,745 0,655 0,122 1,187 
KK -0,570 -0,745 -0,392 -0,655 -1,190 -0,123 
 
Note: *Confidence Intervals are computed using the method proposed by Krinski and Robb (1986); 
